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ARAB SPRING D EMOCRACrES

SARAH S. JAFARl

Turkey has undergone radical changes during the last century.

Modernization and

secularization were the characteristics of ftrst retonns brought about by a brilliant military led by
General Kemal Atatilrk. The military guarded secularization at the expense of other values.
Only recently has any attempt been made to curb the power of the military.

Less secular

politicians more in tune with the majority of the population set Turkey on the road to democracy.
Turgut (hal ( 13 October 1927- 17 Aprill993) concentTated on providing Turkey with a sound
economy. Recep Tayyip Erdogan (26 February 1954- ) brought in democratic reforms, human
rights, and the rule of law.

Military imposition of values on civilian life was necessarily

removed as far as possible. The military is committed to the secular values in which the rulers
set forth for a population the goals and culture they deem best, whatever the population itself
might want. Prime Minister Erdogan, with greater respect for the religious sensibilities of the
majority, has been able to operate in an atmosphere of liberty for the populace and greater
religious choice for the individual than under Atatiirk. He has effectively aimed to close the gap
between the rulers and the ruled.

The question this history suggests is whether Turkey, so new to freedom and democracy
itself, can be seen as a model for the Arab Spring nations.

The Modernization of Turkey and the Rise of Mustafa Kemal (19 May 1881- 10 November
1938):
Egalitarianism was introduced to Turkish society during the early nineteenth century. In
1839, the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Mecit declared a set of reforms called Tanzimat, which
established a list of civil rights that protected all citizens regardless of religious affiliations or
group identity. 1

A generation later, in 1876, reforms were recorded in a constitution and a

Parliament was elected. Unfortunately, the reform period was cut short by new sultan, Abdul
Hamid II, who suspended the constitution and Parliament within one year of its adoption. 2
Sultan Hamid was the 34th sultan of the Ottoman Empire who ruled with absolute power for the
following three decades. 3
Throughout Sultan Hamid's reign, Turkish intellectuals disdained his oppressive rule. As
a ruler, Hamid suppressed dissenting voices and created an army of spies. 4 However, he could
not suppress society's desire for participation in the government. Turkish intellectuals studied
past revolutions and distributed news to gain a following, which would help fight the regime. An
attempt to overthrow Sultan Hamid failed in 1886, which increased the popularity of the idea
amongst young freethinker Turks.
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One of these young idealists was named Mustafa Kemal. Kemal was a cadet in the
Turkish military. He was born in the diverse city of Salonika where he grew up amongst Turks,
as well as Greeks, Jews, and other European nationals. 5 As a young cadet he lived in several
cities including Istanbul and Beirut, which was considered "the Paris of the Middle East." 6
Kemal was least impressed with his time spent in Damascus. The level of illiteracy, religious
orthodoxy, and isolation from the outside world disgruntled him. The darkness and sadness of
Damascus ignited his desire for revolution in his homeland.
Kemal studied western ideals of liberty, self-rule, and secularism and in 1905 formed a
secret society called Vatan (Fatherland), with a group of his companions. 7 Kemal established
branches ·of Vatan in the Ottoman outposts of Beirut, Jerusalem, and Jaffa. He dedicated the
organization to bringing freedom to the Turks by overthrowing the absolutist regime of Sultan
Hamid. 8 Slowly, the movement gained momentum and merged into a coalition called the Young
Turks, who were also secular in outlook.9 The Turkish atmosphere was ablaze with a sense of
revolution and Sultan Hamid could not calm the uproar. Not only did he fail to control revolting
citizens, but he also failed to manage his own troops who joined the defiant march on Istanbul. 10
The Young Turks demanded that Sultan Hamid re-open the Parliament he had closed three
decades earlier. On April 27, 1909, Sultan Hamid was deposed and exiled to Salonika. The
Young Turk Revolution resulted in a return to parliamentary and constitutional rule. 11 Sultan
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Hamid is considered the final authoritative Sultan of the Ottoman Empire although was replaced
by his brother. 12
The Young Turk revolution of 1908 brought several reforms to Turkish society.

It

opened the way for new political parties, infrastructure, newspapers and magazines, and an
increased education budget. 13 The Turks had liberated themselves from authoritarian rule, yet
were skeptical of democracy and occasionally restricted public freedoms to preserve the state.

The Great War, World War I (28 July 1914- 11 November 1918):
Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal was in Sofia, Bulgaria when Archduke Franz
Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914. 14 At the time, Enver Pasha led the
Ottoman military. Kemal, as well as several other military officers, returned from abroad to
follow Pasha's military commands. However, Pasha made a consequential misjudgment and
aligned his empire with the Germans. During the war, the Allied forces were set on crushing the
Ottoman army and planned an assault on the Gallipoli Peninsula. 15 Kemal was assigned as
commander of the key mobile division and as support to the German general who was appointed
by Pasha to direct the peninsula's defense. 16
The year 1915 marked the start of the Battle of Gallipoli. The battle was the initiated by
Winston Churchill, who believed that opening a new front would force the Germans to split their
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army in order to support the "weak" Turkish army. 17 This would leave their lines weakened
elsewhere and the Allies would have a less powerful army to fight against. 18 However, Churchill
underestimated the strength and endurance of the Turkish army. Soldiers from Britain, Australia,
and New Zealand stormed the beaches at Gallipoli and faced heavy Turkish fire. 19 As Allied
forces pushed forward, the Turks called for backup. Kemal's forces emerged and he commanded
the troops. A tough commander, Kemal shouted to his

troops~

"I am not ordering you to attack, I

am ordering you to die! By the time we are dead, other units and commanders will be here to
take our place. "

20

It was at Gallipoli that Kemal firmly established his reputation among his

fellow Turks. He was viewed as a military genius as he naturally improvised military maneuvers
with his troops. About eight months after they had stormed the beaches, Allied troops began a
humiliating retreat, which left the Turks victorious. 21 The Gallipoli Campaign cost the Allies
approximately 265,000 casualties and the Turks about 218,000. 22 Yet triumph at Gallipoli was
the Turks' greatest victory of the war as well as a turning point in Kemal's life. He was a
national hero and when World War I ended in 1918, he had risen to the rank of General.
The war culminated in a loss for the Turks. The Turkish leaders fled the country after
their shameful acts against the Armenians in eastern Turkey and Sultan Mehmet VI V ahdeddin
was left to negotiate Turkey's terms of surrender with the British.

23

The British presented
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abrasive terms and the sultan complied, believing he had no alternative. The Allied forces took
control of Istanbul, all sovereign Ottoman territories in Arabia, and the majority of the Ottoman
army was ordered to demobilize. 24
Kemal was shocked at the armistice terms. He was determined to revolt against the
occupation before Allies dismembered his nation. The Allies had plans to partition Anatolia and
create an Armenian state, a Greek state, colonies for France and Italy, and possibly a Kurdish
state. 25 The idea of their land being lost to local Christian minorities sparked passion of revolt in
the Turks. Kemal, along with other former military leaders, schemed to break from the sultan
and Allied occupation. They planned to escape from Istanbul and trek across to Anatolia where
they would train an army to rebel against the occupation. Kemal traveled to Anatolia to take his
role as a revolutionary leader. He arrived on the coast of Samsun, in north central Turkey, on 19
May 1919. May 19th is now a national holiday that commemorates the beginning of the national
liberation movement initiated by Kemal in 1919. 26
The British were suspicious of Kemal and demanded he be recalled to Istanbul, but by the
time the order was issued, Kemal and his troops had begun their revolt. Kemal summoned
resistance leaders and together they issued a public declaration that they would reject a partition
or foreign occupation and demanded that Turks rule all of Anatolia. 27 Kemal managed to gain
support in Istanbul where a new Parliament passed a resolution insisting on full Turkish
independence. 28 The British sent soldiers to arrest Parliament leaders and threatened to execute
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anyone who expressed additional defiance. It was then that Kemal prompted the Parliament to
reconvene in Ankara, where he had established his headquarters, and the members complied. 29
As Allied diplomats gathered in Sevres to sign a treaty partitioning Turkey amongst the
Greeks, Armenians, Kurds, Italians, French, and British, the members of Turkish resistance
groups convened in Ankara. 30 In Ankara they formed a new Grand National Assembly, which
claimed state power and elected Kemal as its chairman. 31 The Turkish revolution was in some
ways analogous to the American Revolution: patriots banded together to overthrow the British.
Winston Churchill later described the scenario: "[h]is Empire falling to pieces around him, the
Turk was still alive". 32
The Turkish Independence War unfolded across the country in 1920. The Turks pushed
the Russians and Armenians out through the east and attacked the British and Greeks when they
arrived in Ankara. After triumph against the Greeks, Kemal was given the historic title of Gazi,
or warrior, by the Grand National Assembly. 33 The British despised this new war. Finally, five
years after the British had arrived in Istanbul, they accepted that they could not rule over the
Turks. 34
Kemal then sent his confidant, Refet Bele, to convey his message to Sultan Vahdeddin.
Bele was the revolutionary regime's prime minister and he arrived in Istanbul to tell the Sultan
that he must resign. He warned that two governments, one in Istanbul and one in Ankara, would
not persist. The Sultan did not budge, at which point Kemal demanded that the Grand National

29

!d. at 47.
Id
!d. at 48.
32 l d. at 50.
33
Id at 52; In Islam, this title is reserved for great warriors who have fought to successfully
defend their faith.
34
KrNZER, supra note 1, at 55.
3o
31

7

Assembly take a profound step and separate the sultanate from the Islamic caliphate to give the
position of caliph to "[t]he member of the Ottoman family who is most qualified by learning and
character."

35

The Caliph had long dominated the systen1 of Islamic government in the Ottoman

Empire, had long been viewed as "[s]uperhuman and divinely guided ... [and] was understood to
be the point of union of the legislative, judicial, and executive domains of government." 36
Although there was much dispute against this radical change, it ultimately passed and the
sultan's position was abolished. 37 In 1922, with help from the British, the sultan fled Istanbul
and the Ottoman sultanate ended after 634 years. 38 Prince Abdul Mecit, the sultan's more liberal
and artistic cousin, became Caliph of All Islam.
One year later, on 24 July 1923, the British accepted the Lausanne Treaty, which gave the
Turks absolute control over all of Anatolia. 39 The Allied soldiers left Istanbul on 2 October 1923
and the Turks were left with their homeland.

Kemal had led the revolution and won the

Independence War, but had not yet reached his goal. He stated, "[i]t is only now that our real
work begins. " 40

From Kemal to Atatiirk's Reforms:
The Turks victoriously defeated foreign domination with success in the Independence
War, but the country was not yet in order and Kemal set out to modernize Turkey's political
system. He declared to the Grand National Assembly that the form of government of the state of
35
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Turkey would from then on be a Republic and that the Grand National Assembly would elect the
president of the Republic of Turkey. His actions gave birth to the first republic established in a
Muslim country and, in 1923, Mustafa Kemal became the first President of the Republic of
Turkey. 41
The European ideologies aimed at, such as republicanism, nationalism, and secularism,
were drawn from the French. 42 Specifically, the Turkish word for secularism, laiklik, came from
the French word laYcite. 43 Furthermore, several Young Turks had spent time in France and spoke
French.

44

These men were greatly influenced by the works of French thinkers and institutions in

Paris. 4s
After taking office, Kemal unsparingly attacked religious power.

He abolished the

caliphate and closed all Koran schools ("madreses"). 46 Furthermore, he had the state take control
of the entire education system. 47

He forbade pilgrimages to tombs of Muslim saints and

outlawed the practices of Dervish sects, who embodied Sufi traditions. 48 He made sweeping
changes to the legal system by shutting down religious courts and replacing the Muslim code of
Sharia with Swiss civil and criminal codes.

49

The Turkish adoption of the Swiss Codes was due

to the leading young elite who had studied in Switzerland. so The codes were viewed as the most

41
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modem, concise, and simply formulated European codes with the greatest popular touch. 51
Moreover, he replaced the Muslim lunar calendar with the twelve-month western calendar and
declared that Sunday replaced Friday as the official day of rest. 52 Kemal also replaced "prayeroriented timekeeping" with the twenty-four hour clock and directed that the call to prayer no
longer be announced in Arabic, but in Turkish. 53 Furthermore, the Grand National Assembly
enacted a law imposing the metric system and Western numerals. 54 A law that required all Turks
to take a surname followed this and from then on, Kemal became Atatiirk ("Father of the
Turks"). 55 Finally, Atatlirk fully legalized alcohol.
One of Atatiirk's most ambitious reforms was the Alphabet Reform. He banned Arabic
script and invited a group of linguists to create a new Turkish alphabet in 1928. 56 The new
alphabet was in Roman letters and was immediately taught to adults and children. Atatlirk had
dreams of building a European style university, but he could not attract a full faculty due to lack
of Turkish scholars and the disinterest of foreign intellectuals. This changed in 1933, when
Adolf Hitler expelled Jewish faculty from German universities. Atatlirk offered asylum and
employment to the Jews and managed to construct a strong faculty foundation to establish
Istanbul University. 57 Turks had a history of good relations with the Jews, ever since the
Ottomans welcomed exiled Jews from Bavaria and Spain in the fifteenth century. 58

Berthoudhttp://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/Home/Archive/Turkey_marks_80_years_of_Swiss_civil_
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Atatilrk not only aimed to reform his country, but also to change public personal
appearance. Shocking many Turks, he dressed in a suit and tie and often wore a bowler hat.
Atatilrk declared that "[a] civilized, international dress is worthy and appropriate for our nation,
and we will wear it. Boots or shoes on our feet, trousers on our legs, shirts and tie, jacket and
waistcoat, and of course, to complete these, a cover with a brim on our heads. This covering is
called 'hat."' 59 Subsequently, the Grand National Assembly approved the Hat Reform. 60 Under
the Hat Reform, the fez, a hat that had been adopted in the Ottoman era as a symbol of religion,
progress, and modernity, was outlawed. The new Hat Law sparked numerous protests, because it
was "[c]onsidered a symbol of Christian Europe." 61 Those who violated the law faced a oneyear imprisonment and in some instances the protestors were executed. 62
Atatiirk's drastic reforms did not have the support of all Turks. His close partners in the
Independence War turned against him and formed opposition parties that demanded, "[r]espect
for religious opinions and beliefs." 63 Atatiirk, nevertheless, did not believe his country was
ready for competitive politics and imprisoned opposition members. He did not permit time for
any uprisings to be organized and any threats to his power and nation-building goals were
quickly shut down. He once said, "One should not wait before crushing a reactionary movement
[and] one should act at once." 64 This included attempted rebellions by the Kurdish minority in
southeast Turkey and by citizens who had fought under his command during the Independence
War.

Atatiirk considered the Kurds a primitive population.

59
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II

Kurdish leaders were publicly

hanged in Diyarbakir.

65

The government ordered all Kurdish newspapers to be closed, outlawed

Kurdish names, and restricted the use of the Kurdish language. 66
Atatiirk and the Turkish government claimed to be devoted to ideals of liberty and
freedom, yet he was intolerant of Turkish diversity. This type of repression had occurred before,
in 1915, when Armenian rebels were deemed a threat and horrendously slaughtered by Turkish
troops, with no exception for women and children. 67 Disdain of diversity was further expressed
when the government enforced a population exchange based on religion. 68 This exchange
occurred in 1923, after the Treaty of Lausanne ended the Greek-Turkish war of 1919-1922. 69 It
is analogous to modem day "ethnic cleansing" campaigns. Approximately 1.5 million Ottoman
citizens of Greek descent were forced to vacate their homes in Anatolia and move to Greece,
while about 500,000 Muslims who lived in Greece were forced to move to Turkey. 70 It has been
found that the majority of Greeks fled with the Greek army after their defeat in the war and that
approximately 150,000 were resettled in Greece in an orderly way. 71
Although Atatiirk had goals of modernization and liberty, in practice he was considered
radically intolerant by most of society. As he grew older, his fiery energy faded; he became tired
and introspective. 72 In 1936, he was diagnosed with cirrhosis, likely as a result of his excessive
consumption of alcohol, cigarettes, and coffee. Then on 10 November 193 8, Atatiirk passed
65
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away, at the age of fifty-seven. 73 The news of his death caused an outburst of public grief. His
body was transported to Ankara and placed in a mausoleum, which today is the closest memorial
Turkey has to a national shrine and is visited by millions of people every year. 74 In 1932, H. C.
Armstrong, a British officer imprisoned by the Turks in World War I, wrote the first full-length
English biography of Atatlirk. 75 He accurately described Atatiirk as, "A MAN, cruel, bitter, ironwilled, who overthrew the Sultan in 1908; battered the British Empire off Gallipoli in 1915;
chased the Greeks into the sea at Smyrna in 1922; harried the victorious Allies out of
Constantinople in 1923; destroyed the power of the Caliph in 1924; hanged the entire opposition
in 1926; and by 1932 had made out of a crumbling empire A NATION." 76
Many Turks do not think the Turkey of today would exist without Atatlirk. Although he
ruled by force and destroyed religious freedoms, he built a government based on organizations
and institutions and brought new secular dignity and confidence to the people of Turkey.
Atatlirk was so respected that in 1951 parliament passed a law that made it a crime to explicitly
insult or ridicule his legacy. 77

Atatiirk was aware that "[a]bsolutism leads ultimately to

instability, and that even dictatorship should have limits." 78

Educated Turks believed In

constitutionalism and republican government long before Atatiirk. Turks would one day achieve
true political democracy, but at the time, it was largely felt that Atatiirk's rule was the only type
of government possible.

73
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Turkey Post Atatiirk (11 November 1938- 13 March 2003):
After Atatiirk' s death, the Grand National Assembly elected his chief lieutenant, Mustafa
ismet inonii, the second president of the Republic of Turkey. 79 Learning from history, President
inonii aimed to keep his country neutral during World War II.

Ultimately, Turkey became

aligned with the United States and broke diplomatic relations with Adolf Hitler's government. 80
Later, this action permitted Turkey to become one of the fifty-one original members of the
United Nations.

81

The Turks carried on their relationship with the United States by sending

fifteen thousand soldiers to Korea to fight along side the Americans. 82 As the Korean War and
the Cold War heightened, Turkey became viewed as a valued partner and in 1952 Turkey was
admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO"). 83 This was a colossal step for
Turkey and established its position as a European power.
Unlike Atatiirk, President inonii permitted competitive elections, since he saw that Turks
were ready and wanted to choose their own leaders. On 22 May 1950, Turks rushed to the polls
and elected Adnan Menderes as their new prime minister. 84 Prime minister Menderes spent a
decade in office, during which the Turkish population more than doubled and per capita income
tripled from 1950 to 1960. 85 Menderes' early years benefitted from economic prosperity, but
during his third term the economy began to falter.
79
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censoring the press. 86 On 27 May 1960, after decreased support for the regime, the Menderes
government was overthrown in a coup d'etat by a group of army officers. 87 Several government
leaders were sentenced to death and Menderes was executed. 88 Thus began a series of military
coup d'etats displacing civilian rule.
The military took rigid control and engineered coup d'etats in 1971, 1980, and in 1997 a
post-modem coup d'etat.

The military was a long-standing symbol of a secular Turkey,

envisioned by Atatiirk for decades. After seizing the government, the military withdrew from
power, until they staged a new coup d'etat. Political parties became dominated by military
control and military intervention in politics was frequent. It was not until recently, with the
emergence of the Recep Tayyip Erdogan administration, that the military's role changed.

The Rise of Democracy, Prime Minister Erdogan (13 March 2003- Present):

Recep Tayyip Erdogan was raised in the Kasimpasha neighborhood of Istanbul where he
attended an imam hatip school. 89 At a young age he worked for the Istanbul transit authority but
quit after a dispute with his boss. His boss had demanded that he shave his mustache, because it
was seen as an Islamic symbol, but Erdogan refused. 90 This was one of his first political
statements as a young man.
In 1994 Erdogan ran for mayor of Istanbul and was elected. He was considered an
"Islamic politician" and viewed as more efficient and honest than his predecessors. 91 At the
time, the military generals were wary of any religiously oriented leaders. In a post-modem coup
Id
See Adnan Menderes, supra note 83.
88 Id
89
KINZER, supra note 1, at 13 2.
90 ld
91 Id
86
87
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d'etat, in 1997, Prime Minister Erbakan, a Muslim man, was forced to resign from office. 92
Erdogan responded to the coup d'etat by forming a new party called the Justice and
Development party, also known as the AK Party. 93 Shortly after, Erdogan recited a verse from a
Turkish poem in a speech under the umbrella of the AK Party. The poem read, "The mosques
are our barracks, their domes are our helmets, Minarets are our bayonets, and the faithful our
soldiers."94 Ziya Gokalp, a defender of secularism, had ironically, written the poem. 95 Pressured
by military generals, prosecutors charged him with inciting religious hatred, alleging that he was
determined to destroy secularism and was advocating an Islamic revolution. 96 Erdogan was
convicted and sentenced to ten months in jail, but he was freed after four months.
Erdogan treated his conviction as an honor and promised his supporters, "This song is not
over yet!" 97 It was clear that the military were trying to teach him a lesson, but it backfired and
Erdogan became a hero and a martyr for democracy. After being released he ignited a grassroots
political campaign that resulted in a sweeping victory and Erdogan was elected prime minister of
the Republic of Turkey in 2003. 98
Once in office, Erdogan began implementing various reforms. He abolished the death
penalty, ended torture in Turkish prisons, and guaranteed prisoners' rights. 99 He repealed
repressive laws that had been drafted to intimidate dissenters, amended the constitution so that it

92

!d. at 133.
Justice and Development Party, ENCYCLOPtEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE Encyclopredia (Nov. 15
2011 ), http://www. britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1 0 18363/Justice-and-Development-Party.
94
Turkey's Charismatic pro-Islamic Leader, BBC NEWS, (Nov. 4, 2002),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2270642.stm
95 !d.
96 !d.
97
KINZER, supra note I, at 134.
98
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, ENCYCLOPtEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE Encyclopredia (Nov. 15 2011),
http://www. britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/913988/Recep-Tayyip-Erdogan
99
KINZER, supra note I, at 134.
93

16

accepted the authority of the European Convention on Human Rights, and turned the National
Security Council, which was the military's weapon to harass political leaders, into a civilian run
advisory board. 100
Although he is greatly admired for the aforementioned reforms, Prime Minister Erdogan
is criticized for not resolving certain domestic issues that have been a part of Turkish politics for
decades. The primary issue is that of ethnic Kurds who live primarily in the east and southeast
regions of Turkey. In the 1930s the Turkish government performed a failed attempt to assimilate
the Kurds. The Kurds' resistance movements have persisted throughout the years and there have
been several Kurdish rebellions resulting in the death of thousands of Kurds. 101 When Prime
Minister Erdogan took office in 2003, he was determined to reverse Turkey's decade-old policy
of Kurdish repression. 102 He eased restrictions on the ban of the Kurdish language and held talks
with Kurdistan Workers' Party ("PKK") to resolve the conflict. 103
Peace was not reached and in recent years Kurdish activists have been staging attacks
against Turks in the capital city of Ankara. 104 It has been argued that the Kurds are backed by
Israel, which seeks revenge for Turkey's expulsion of the Israeli ambassador after Israel refused
to apologize for attacking and killing several Turks aboard the Mavi Marmara-a flotilla
carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza in May 20 I 0. 105
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It is clear that peace between the Turks and Kurds is important if Turkey wishes to be a
democratic leader that protects minorities within its state, but evidently the ongoing conflict has
layers of complexity.
Another criticism against Prime Minister Erdogan has been from the Armenian
government, Turkey's neighboring state, and the Armenian diaspora that want Turkey to
recognize the murder of 1.5 million Armenians in 1915 as genocide committed by the Ottoman
Turks. 106 The Turkish government continues to claim the deaths were a result of famine, disease,
and World War I battles. 107 Although Prime Minister Erdogan will not recognize the genocide,
in 2009 he signed a deal to re-establish diplomatic ties with Armenia and to open their shared
border, which has remained closed since 1993 when Armenia went to war against Azerbaijan
over the disputed territory of Nagomo-Karabakh. 108 The deal came to a halt when Prime
Minister Erdogan stated, "Unless Azerbaijan and Armenia sign a protocol on NagomoKarabakh, we will not sign any final agreement with Armenia on ties. We are doing preliminary
work but this definitely depends on resolution of the Nagomo-Karabakh problem." 109 There are
currently no diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia.
Although Prime Minister Erdogan has been criticized for his inability to reach an
agreement with the Kurds and Armenians, the reforms he has implemented have paved Turkey's
path to democratic and economic success and greatly outweigh his shortcomings.
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History of the Ban Against Islamic Headscarves in Turkish Educational Institutions (19812003):

The ban against the wearing of Islamic headscarves has been an issue of debate in Turkey
for decades. Opponents of the law view it through a lens of human rights and religious

freedom~

while proponents of the ban deem it necessary to prevent Islamization of society and maintain
strict secular order in Turkey. 110
The first regulation addressing wearing of headscarves in universities was issued in 1981.
The regulation "[r]equired staff working for public organizations and institutions and personnel
and students at State institutions to wear ordinary,

sober~

modem dress ... [and] female members

of staff and students [to] not wear veils in educational institutions."ll 1 Following this regulation,
the Higher Education Council issued a circular, which prohibited women from wearing
headscarves in university classes because it was a "[s]ymbol of a vision that is contrary to the
freedoms ofwomen and the fundamental principles ofthe Republic [ofTurkey]." 112
In 1988, the Turkish Grand National Assembly ("TGNA") responded by passing a
provision that stated that "Modem dress or appearance shall be compulsory in the rooms and
corridors of higher-education

institutions~

preparatory schools,

laboratories~

clinics and

multidisciplinary clinics. A veil or headscarf covering the neck and hair may be worn out of
religious conviction."

113

President Kenan Evren responded by applying to the Turkish

Constitutional Court to annul this provision. Because the Turkish Constitution does not have a
specific provision regarding wearing of religious clothing in universities, the Court was left to
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subjectively address the principle factors required for secularism. In 1989 the court struck down
the provision in a 10-1 decision, stating that the provision violated the Preamble, Article 2
(secularism), Article 10 (equality before the law), Article 24 (freedom of religion), and Article
174 (protection of Atatiirk's reforms) of the Constitution. 114 The Court emphasized that the
provision was inconsistent with the important secular principles established by Atatiirk,
particularly because in a secular state, laws should not be derived from religion. It stated that
"[l]aws that are based on religion mandate different laws for different religions and do not
encompass the principle of religion ... " 115 Furthermore, the Court noted that the provision was
based on religion which immediately eliminated the neutrality a secular government must have
towards all religions. 116
In regards to Article 10 of the Constitution of equality before the law, the Court found
that the provision was in violation because it made a special exception for Islamic clothing "out
of religious conviction". 117 The Court stated that the provision would lead to the coercion of all
Islamic women to wear headscarves. 118 The Court further noted that the violation of Article 24,
on freedom of religion, would result because wearing of religious symbols in a university would
ultimately lead to discrimination between people of both different and the same religions. It
stated that Muslim women who did not choose to wear a headscarf would inevitably be viewed
as faithless or nonbelievers and would be discriminated against. 119
One year after the Turkish Constitutional Court's decision, the TGNA passed a new law
that stated that "Choice of dress shall be free in higher-education institutions, provided that it
114
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does not contravene the laws in force.'' 120 Rather than explicitly permit religious clothing, the
law allowed freedom of dress, in order to abide by the constitutional principles the Court had
previously stated were violated. Again, there was an application to the Constitutional Court for
the annulment of the law. The Court held the law constitutional in a 7-4 decision. 121 However,
the Court reasoned that women would still not be allowed to wear headscarves in educational
institutions because wearing the headscarf violated the "laws in force [the Turkish
Constitution]." 122 The Court held that, "The freedom afforded by this provision is conditional on
its not being contrary to 'the laws in force'. The [previous] judgment of the Constitutional Court
established that covering one's neck and hair with the headscarf is first and foremost contrary to
the Constitution." 123 Ultimately, although the Court held that the law was constitutional, it stated
that the law was conditioned on a matter that was violated and, thus, the law did not allow
women to wear headscarves in universities. 124

Ley/a $ahin v. Turkey (2004):

The issue surrounding the ban of headscarves was heightened further by Leyla Sahin.
Ms. Sahin brought her case to the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR"), alleging that
Turkey's ban against the wearing· of Islamic headscarves in educational institutions violated her
rights under Article 8, 9, 10, 14, and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 125 She argued that the circular violated her rights
because there was "[n]o statutory basis for the circular and the Vice-Chancellor's Office had no
120
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regulatory power in that sphere." 126 In addition, she alleged the ban violated her Article 14 rights
because it forced students to choose between education and religion and her rights under Article
8 and 10 because the ban hindered her ability to express her beliefs. 127
Ms.

~ahin

was enrolled as a student at the University of Istanbul Department of Medicine

in August 1997. 128 Prior to her enrollment, the University of Istanbul had adopted a resolution
which stated that "[t]he Constitutional Court has delivered a judgment which prevents religious
attire from being worn in universities." 129 Moreover, on 23 February 1998, the Vice Chancellor
of the university issued a circular which stated, in part, that "[s]tudents whose 'heads are
covered' (who wear the Islamic headscarf) and students (including overseas students) with
beards must not be admitted to lectures, courses or tutorials." 130
In the following months Ms.

~ahin

was denied access to take an oncology examination,

the chair excluded her from a course on orthopedic traumatology, refused her admission to a
neurology lecture, and denied her permission to complete a public health examination all because
she was wearing an Islamic headscarf. 131 Thereafter, Ms. ~ahin filed suit in the Istanbul
Administrative Court for an order setting aside the circular. 132

The Court dismissed the

application, holding that a university vice-chancellor had the power to regulate students' dress
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for purposes of maintaining order in the university setting. 133 On appeal, the Council of State
affirmed this judgment.
Ms.

~ahin

applied her case to the ECHR and argued that the headscarfban "[c]onstituted

an unjustified interference with her right to freedom of religion, in particular, her right to
manifest her religion [under Article 9]." 134 Article 9 states:
1. Everyone has the .right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to . change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others. 135
The ECHR Chamber held unanimously that Article 9 of the Convention was not violated by the
implementation of the headscarf ban, because the interference with Ms.

~ahin' s

right to manifest

her religion pursued a legitimate aim and was "necessary in a democratic society." 136 The Court
did not address her claims under Articles 8, 10, or 14 reasoning that the circumstances were the
same as those discussed in regards to Article 9. 137
Ms.

~ahin

then applied to the Grand Chamber of the ECHR.

The Grand Chamber

affirmed the lower court, in a 16-1 decision, stating the Islamic headscarf ban in universities did
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not violate Article 9 of the Convention. The court stated that the interference with Ms.

~ahin's

right to manifest her religion was "prescribed by law" because it had a basis in domestic law, the
basis was accessible to Ms.

~ahin,

and the interference was foreseeable to a degree that is

reasonable in the circumstances. 138 The court held that although there was an interference in Ms.
~ahin's

right to manifest her religion, it was validly based on the 1991 interpretation of religious

clothing in educational institutions by the Turkish Constitutional Court, which was accessible by
Ms.

~ahin,

and the interference by the University was foreseeable since the regulation was

enacted in 1994. 139 Furthermore, the court noted that the interference with Ms. ~ahin's right to
manifest her religion was "[p]rimarily [for the purpose of] pursuing the legitimate aims of
protecting the rights and freedoms of others and of protecting public order." 140
Finally, the Court affirmed that the interference was "necessary in a democratic society",
especially in the Turkish context, to prevent fundamentalist religious movements from pressuring
students and protecting public order. 141 The Court emphasized that there is a "margin of
appreciation" accorded to the member states in order to permit the state to protect the rights and
freedoms of others, to secure civil peace, and to promote "true religious pluralism" through the
regulation of education. 142 The Court accorded a great deference to the university leaders stating
that they were in a better position to evaluate the needs of the university and to· the laws of
Turkey enshrining secularism. 143
In regard to Ms.

~ahin's

claim that her Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 right (stating "no

person shall be denied the right to education") had been violated, the Court held that the right to
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education may be limited through the "margin of appreciation" enjoyed by the state and the right
is not absolute. 144 The Court noted that the limitations to Ms. ~ahin's education aimed to
"[p ]reserve the secular character of educational institutions" and, thus, there was no violation of
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 ofthe Convention. 145
The Court concluded by assessing the headscarf ban in relation to gender equality and
women's rights. The Court stated that gender equality is a central principle of the Convention
and "[a] goal to be achieved by member States of the Council of Europe" and allowing women to
wear the Islamic headscarf in educational institutions violated gender equality in Turkey. 146 It
further noted that "[w]earing the Islamic headscarf could not easily be reconciled with the
message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination ... " 147

Imperfections of the ECHR's Decision:

In Ley/a $ahin v. Turkey, Ms.

~ahin

contested the Chamber's findings with points that

took into account a comprehensive view of Turkey's history. She argued that "[t]he notions of
'democracy' and 'republic' were not alike. While many totalitarian regimes claim to be
'republics', only a true democracy could be based on the principles of pluralism and
broadmindedness." 148 She accurately claimed that the structure of Turkey's government and
university systems were .the result of decades of military coup d'etats and not politically
legitimate. 149 By not taking this into account, the ECHR foolishly granted extreme deference to
the Turkish Constitutional Court and did not strictly scrutinize Turkey's assessment of the need
144
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of the headscarf ban. Ms. Sahin also argued that there had been no signs of tension that would
have justified the radical measure taken by the Court. 150 Ms. Sahin was an adult who was fully
able to determine what was appropriate conduct and the allegations that she had shown
disrespect towards others by wearing her Islamic headscarf were entirely unfounded. 151 She had
not sought to influence other students by wearing the Islamic headscarf and the Court presented
no evidence that she had ever attempted to exert coercive pressure on her classmates. 152 Her
choice to wear the headscarf had been wholly based on "[r]eligious conviction, which was the
most important fundamental right that [a] pluralistic, liberal democracy had granted her." 153 Her
decision to wear the headscarf should be indisputable if she considers it appropriate.
In its opinion, the ECHR continuously defended the value of secularism to protect
democracy in Turkey, yet it did not correctly judge Turkey's interpretation of secularism. The
Court unquestionably accepted that any action taken by Turkey to preserve the principle of
secularism was consistent with human rights, rather than strictly scrutinize the denial of a right to
an individual and weigh the consequences carefully. The Court should have looked to recent
Turkish history, which is plagued with military coup d'etats and no truly democratically elected
leaders.
Rather than allowing religious freedom, the Turkish state imposed Kemalist Islam on
society. For decades, the Kemalist military leaders used strict secularist ideals to control the
political arena, while incorporating Islam when it was politically advantageous.
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through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (the Diyanet). 155 The Diyanet also controlled
contents of the imam's Friday prayer sermons and regulated Turkey's 75,000 mosques. 156
Unfortunately, the ECHR did not address any of these issues when deciding whether the
headscarf ban was necessary.

Rather than be influenced by its own political agenda and

Islamophobia, the Court should have discussed the possibility of the Kemalists' desire to
indoctrinate female students and convert them to their practice of Kemalist Islam.
Furthermore, the ECHR showed ignorance when stating that wearing the Islamic
headscarf was an expression of gender inequality.

It is evident that the Court was highly

influenced by the French stereotypes of the Islamic headscarf and by French-influenced Kemalist
stereotypes, when writing the opinion.

Western popular culture has for long struggled to

understand how there could be any other reason than coercion that a Muslim woman would wear
a headscarf. Many supporters of the ban view the headscarf as "[o]ppressive, reasoning that
women who 'choose' to wear the headscarf must have been brainwashed by their families and
their religion into thinking that they are required to wear it." 157 In its opinion, the Court
addressed its concern for gender inequality within Islam, rather than fully focus on the task to
determine whether a headscarf ban is necessary in a democratic society. 158 If the ECHR's goal
was to promote gender equality by upholding the headscarf ban in universities, the decision was
extraordinarily underinclusive.
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ignores that coercion is not the only reason that women choose to wear an Islamic headscarf.
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Many Muslim women consider dressing provocatively in public repressive and feel that modest
dress is freeing. Women have also chosen to wear the Islamic headscarf for reasons of political
protest, expression of personal identity, custom, culture, and religious conviction. Whatever the
reason may be, to wear or not to wear a headscarf should be a choice made by each woman and
not one imposed by law.
The ECHR's ruling may have superficially set out to protect women from coercion and
curb fundamentalist Islam, yet in effect it precluded a large group of women from attending
universities at all. Daughters of wealthy families, like Prime Minister Erdogan's daughters, were
able to send their children to study in the United States where they have the freedom of choice. 160
However, the majority of women who were forced not to wear a headscarf at university
continued to wear the headscarf; giving up access to education rather than betray their values.
Many women were no longer competitive in the job market and did not receive the benefit of a
secular education that is so highly valued by the Turkish Constitutional Court.

Similar to

"[p]olicies of forced veiling that terrorize the women of some other Islamic countries, Turkey's
ban 'undercuts individual autonomy and choice, a fundamental aspect of vvomen's rights."' 161
Freedom of choice for each individual woman would resolve the issue of wotnen being forced to
·wear the headscarf and the issue of women denied the right to choose.
Erdogan's Response to the Islamic HeadscarfBan:

In his victorious 2007 campaign, Prime Minister Erdogan promised to lift the ban on
Islamic headscarves in public institutions.

162

In 2008, the Turkish Parliament passed a

Constitutional amendment that gave women the right to wear headscarves in Turkish
ld
Bleiberg, supra note 126, at 163.
162
Turkey and Islam: Veils of Half-Truth, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 14, 2008),
http://www.economist.com/node/1 0701684.
160
161

28

universities. 163 Erdogan's AK Party stated that the ban had stopped education for many women
and that wearing a headscarf was a matter of personal and religious freedorn, but the military and
Turkish Courts stated that easing the ban would violate the Constitution's secular principles and
blocked removal of the ban. 164
On 12 September 2010, a constitutional referendum was passed on twenty-six proposed
changes to the Turkish Constitution that had been drafted by the military after seizing power in
1980. 165 Approximately 58% of voters were proponents of the amendments, which aimed to
bring the Constitution more in line with European Union standards.

166

The amendments

included granting ·civilian courts power to try military personnel for crimes against the state,
strengthening gender equality, and banning discrimination against children, elderly, and disabled
persons. 167 The amendments also removed the ban on politically motivated strikes and allowed
workers to join more than one union. 168
After winning the referendum, the head of the government's Higher Education Board
(YOK), Yusuf Ziya Ozcan, vowed to support any university student who was disciplined for
wearing an Islamic headscarf on campus.

Mr. Ozcan stated that "You cannot tell anyone,

especially a female student over the age of 18, how to dress. This is humiliating for them ... We
[YOK] will do our part [as] this is a matter of the right to an education. No one can take that
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away ... I give my personal guarantee [that] students who do not wear headscarves will also be
under our protection." 169
Although the debate has not ended, the actions of the AK Party has resulted in almost all
universities in Turkey abandoning the prohibition of women wearing headscarves. 170 The
abandonment of this law is the path to preservation of a fundamental human right to freedom of
religion, which had been violated for decades. University students who had been long been
deprived of their rights have stated, "I feel happy that I don't have to stop in a mosque on the
way [to class] and change into [a] wig." 171 The AK Party has made a move toward justice and
religious freedom, which are key principles necessary in a true democracy.

Changing Role of the Turkish Military with the Emergence of the AK Party:

The Turkish military has long seen itself as the guardian of Turkey's secular system and
has forcefully intervened when it has felt any threat towards its Kemalist regime. The military
has overthrown civilian governments through engineered coup d'etats in 1960, 1971, and
1980. 172 Most recently, in 1997, a military led campaign forced the resignation of Turkey's first
Islamic government. 173
The absolute control of the government by the military was suddenly interrupted with the
bombshell resignations of several military chiefs in July 2011. The resignations are said to be
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the result of the government arresting senior officers accused of plotting a military coup d' etat. 174
The chief of the Turkish armed forces, Isik Kosaner, as well as the heads of the army, navy, and
air force resigned just hours after a court "[c]harged twenty-two suspects, including several
generals and officers, with carrying out an internet campaign to undermine the government." 175
The allegations stemmed from tension between the military and AK Party and the 2003
"Sledgehammer" conspiracy-a coup d'etat planned at a military seminar to depose the
government. 176
The resignations, which occurred shortly before a round of military promotions, were
unprecedented in Turkey. For the first time in history, civilians took charge of appointing new
commanders to the Turkish armed forces. After a four-day meeting chaired by Prime Minister
Erdogan, the new appointment decisions were made, led by announcement of the new army
chief, General Necdet 6zel. 177 General Ozel had been a visibly apolitical officer, but it is too
soon to know if his leadership will reform the armed forces. However, the massive military
resignation can be viewed as a mini-revolution in Turkey.

The AK Party has successfully

established the principle of civilian supremacy over the unconditional military rule that had
unseated four Turkish governments and achieved an important principle of true democracy.

Turkey as a Model for the Arab Spring's Emerging Democracies:

Although Turkey has only recently arrived at its democratic destination with the
emergence of the AK Party, it is likely that emulation of its success will result in progress and
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success in the Arab Spring nations. A main motto during Arab Spring demonstrations was "The
people want to bring down the regime." 178 In Tunisia, the nation that sparked the initial set of
protests, citizens were infuriated by high unemployment rates, government corruption, poor
living conditions, food inflation, and lack of freedom of speech. 179 After successfully ousting
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who had held office for twenty-three years, Tunisia held its
first democratic elections on 23 October 20 11. 180 Voters elected representatives for the new
Constituent Assembly, which is responsible for drawing up a new constitution and appointing a
new transition government. 181
In a historic poll, the moderate Islamic Ennahda party won 41% of the vote, securing 90
seats in the 217-member parliament. 182 Tunisia's largest secularist party, the Congress for the
Republic, came second with nearly 14% and 30 seats in parliament. 183 Ennahda, which was
banned under the Ben Ali regime, "[s]ays it has modeled itself on the governing AK Party in
Turkey, another Muslim-majority country which has remained a secular state." 184 Like Prime
Minister Erdogan, the Ennahda party leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, has vowed to make Tunisia a
"[f]ree, independent, developing and prosperous [state], in which the rights of God, the Prophet,
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women, men, the religious and the non-religious are assured because Tunisia is for everyone." 185
Foreign tourism is a great source of revenue for Tunisia (employing 400,000 people and worth
approximately $2.5bn to the GDP in one year), as it is for Turkey, thus Ennahda has said it will
not ban alcohol or bikinis on beaches. 186
Egypt, another Arab Spring nation, is scheduled to have its first parliamentary elections,
since the overthrow of former President Hosni Mubarak, on 28 November 2011. 187 For the
majority of the nine months since Mubarak's resignation, Egypt's Supreme Military Council has
been in control of the country. The military generals have appointed a weak cabinet and prime
minister and aim to maintain control of Egypt beyond election day. 188 They are promoting
constitutional principles that will secure the military's place as guardians of the state and place
military supremacy above parliamentary power. 189 Ironically, the protesters seem to have paved
the path for a military dictatorship for generals who were long loyal to Mubarak. The military
has arrested protesters, tortured them, and put them on trial before military tribunals. 190 The
military has not moved to revive the Egyptian economy, which activists believe is a military
tactic to remain in control of civilians. 191 Egyptians are currently protesting against provisions
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that grant great constitutional power to the military. 192 The protesters believe that the "[a]nny is
the people's institution, and the people have the right to supervise it [and not vice versa]." 193
Turkey's model of pro-business and pro-globalization can help both the Tunisian and
Egyptian economies prosper through trade and economic progress. After all, the Arab Spring
demonstrations were greatly precipitated by poverty and high unemployment rates. In the past
decade, Prime Minister Erdogan has "[a]ggressively embraced free market capitalism and nearly
tripled per capita income in the Turkey." 194 The AK Party has successfully found a balance
between issues of faith, nationalism, religion, and globalism while achieving economic and
political stability. 195 Under Prime Minister Erdogan, Turkey has become a "[m]anufacturing and
export powerhouse."

196

The AK Party has addressed Islam's call for social justice by

"[c]ombin[ing] privatization with massive social welfare programs that offer affordable housing,
near-universal health care and the free distribution of sugar, flour, coal and even
schoolbooks." 197 Most importantly, the AK Party has shown the world that Islam, democracy,
and secularism can harmoniously co-exist.
Arab Spring countries should look to the democratization of Turkey and build a
respectful relationship between religious and secular sects of their civil societies. The threat to
democracy is authoritarian rule, not Islam. When drafting their new constitutions, Tunisia and
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Egypt should mandate "[e]lections, individual rights, and protections for women and
minorities."

198

These protections will be the defense against authoritarian leaders, whether they

are in the form of military generals or dictators.
For a democracy to strive, it is crucial, especially in the current state of Egypt, that the
military be subservient to the elected civilian authority. It was not until the AK Party cemented
its authority over the Turkish military, that it was able to govern without high risk of a military
organized coup d'etat. The current Egyptian protests are evidence that the people of Egypt fear
that their revolution may be hijacked by the military. The Egyptian military has refused to
withdraw its guideline, but has agreed to continue the debate with political leaders who stand
true to principles of parliamentary rule. 199 Egyptians should examine the AK Party's success in
cementing civilian control of the military in order to block the path to Egypt becoming a military
state.
As Prime Minister Erdogan declared to a crowd in .Cairo in the summer of 20 11,
"Democracy and freedom is as basic a right as bread and water for you ... Governments have to
get their legitimacy from the people's will. Otherwise they are illegitimate, this is the core of
Turkey's politics in the region." 200 This ability to balance Islam and democracy is rare and
should be carefully studied by Arab Spring nations as they draft. new constitutions and form new
governn1ents. Essential to the success of Turkey's democracy is that the AK Party does not view
secularism as a means to oppress religion, but as a principle that leads to dealings with people in
every religion in an equal manner.
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contradictions between Islam and secularism in its modern sense."201 He has called for secular
constitutions in the Arab Spring nations and intellectuals throughout the Arab world
"[u]nderstand that a secular constitution resembles a safety

valve~

maintains the country's unity,

enhances its national security, and allows the country to merge into the international system."202
The struggle will be to convince the majority of the Arab world that a modem secular
constitution does not oppress freedom of religion~ as it did during the reign of Atatlirk's Turkey.

It must be conveyed to those who have lived under authoritarian rule for decades that they need
not choose between economic prosperity and individual freedom. Prime Minister Erdogan's
actions of defending religious freedom of expression through his attempts to lift the Islamic
headscarf ban and his successful restructuring of the role of the military demonstrates the
possibility of secular democracy to exist harmoniously in a Muslim majority state. Turkey has
successfully achieved a balance and its model should be used to help the Arab Spring nations
establish economic and political stability and strength to build rich, sustainable democracies in
the region.
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